心理因果问题——从金在权的排他性论证到副现象论  

Mental Causation from Kim's Exclusion Argument to Epiphenomenalism

作　　者：马醒初[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学哲学院,北京100872

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2017年第6期16-20,共5页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目"认知科学对哲学的挑战"(11&ZD187)

摘　　要：在非还原物理主义下,金在权用排他性论证说明了目前的非还原物理主义或不令人满意,或不稳固,他推断了其可能的坍塌方向,即副现象论或还原物理主义,但该论证本身又有缺陷,如做修正,则得到四种可能的立场,即还原物理主义,分别预设物理因果封闭律和强物理因果封闭律的两种副现象论,和过决定论。文中的论证指出只有预设强物理因果封闭律的副现象论为可取,且这一立场也能和当今的心理-生理学的经验科学研究相吻合,即心理-行为因果只是大脑为行为提供的解释,而不是真实的,物理的因果关系。Jaegwon Kim has argued, using his exclusion argument, that all current forms of nonreductive physicalisms are either unstable or unsatisfactory, they resolve either into epiphenomenalism or reductive physicalism. There may, however, be a logical defect in Kim＇s exclusion argument. If modified, we will end up with four possible positions, which arc, identity theory, two kinds of epiphenomenalism respectively presupposing Closure or Strong Closure, and the over - determination position. The argument in this article claim that only the epiphenomenalism presupposing Strong Closure should be accepted. The conclusion of this modified exclusion argument also consist with current empirical science psychology and physiology, which implies that our experiences of mental causation are merely some kind of explanatory system that our brains supply. Our minds do not have any real, physical, causal role.

关 键 词：心理因果 随附性 非还原物理主义 排他性论证 副现象论 

分 类 号：B152[哲学宗教—世界哲学]