完善国有上市公司治理结构的路径研究  

The Pathtowards Perfecting Governance Structure of State-owned Listed Companies Corporate

作　　者：翟文华[1] 周志太[1] DI Wenhua ZHOU Zhitai(School of Economics, Huaibei Normal University, Huaibei, 23500)

机构地区：[1]淮北师范大学经济学院,中国淮北235000

出　　处：《上海商学院学报》2017年第2期78-82,共5页Business Economic Review

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"基于经济学视角的协同创新网络研究"(项目编号:15FJL013);安徽省社科规划项目"安徽省国有上市公司高管创新协同研究"(项目编号:AHSKY2015D42)

摘　　要：国有上市公司存在的"内部人治理"问题,破解的关键在于强化官员的问责制。明晰代理链节点之间权利义务,促使官员和国企高管尽职尽责。强化董事会权力,健全监事会的权力与责任平衡机制;通过混合所有制,破解国有股"一股独大"的问题。The problem of ＂insider governance＂ is quite common in state-owned listed companies, and the key to this problem is to strengthen the accountability system for officials, so that duties and rights are clear between the agent chain-nodes. It also arouses conscientiousness among officials and chief executives. Strengthening the board of directors, the powers and duties of the board of supervisors shall balance mechanism. Through mixed ownership, this paper hopes to solve the problem of state-owned shares having the final call.

关 键 词：所有权虚位 法人治理结构 问责制 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]