股权激励:是高管独享还是全员持股?——基于《关于上市公司实施员工持股计划试点的指导意见》的思考  

Equity Incentive:Executive Exclusive or Total Holdings?

作　　者：朱砚秋[1] 杨力[2] 

机构地区：[1]安徽理工大学经济与管理学院 [2]安徽理工大学人文社会科学学院

出　　处：《财会通讯（下）》2017年第6期80-85,共6页Communication of Finance and Accounting

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(项目编号:71371014)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：本文以2008-2015年沪深两市公布并实施股权激励的上市公司为样本,运用多元线性回归分析法,实证研究股权激励对象的选择对股权激励效果的影响,实证结果发现:股权激励对象的范围显著影响股权激励的效果,即股权激励对象的范围越大,股权激励的效果越好;股权激励方案中授予高管股份占激励总股份的比正向影响股权激励效果,但并不显著;产权性质和行业特征显著影响股权激励对象的范围,即非国有企业、高新技术行业企业与股权激励对象范围显著正相关。Taking listed companies which announced and implemented equity incentive between 2008-2015 for the sample,using multiple linear regression analysis to study the impact to the equity incentive effect of the choice of equity incentive object.The empirical results show that:the range of equity incentive object influences the equity incentive effect significantly.the larger the range of equity incentive object,the better of the equity incentive effect;the shares of the executives take up of the total shares in equity incentive scheme positive influence on equity incentive effcet.but not significantly;property rights and enterprise characteristics obviously influence the range of equity incentive object,non-state-owned enterprises and high-tech industry enterprises positively related to the range of equity incentive object.

关 键 词：股权激励 员工持股 激励强度 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]