国有企业混合所有制改革的方式选择——基于社会福利最大化视角  

Choices of Mixed Ownership Reform of State-owned Enterprises——Based on the Perspective of Social Welfare Maximization

作　　者：陈晓珊[1] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学产业经济研究院,广东广州510632

出　　处：《首都经济贸易大学学报》2017年第4期78-86,共9页Journal of Capital University of Economics and Business

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"人民币汇率变动幅度对经济波动影响及中国企业承受能力研究"(71273068)

摘　　要：基于社会福利最大化视角,着重讨论国有企业混合所有制改革的方式选择。研究发现:(1)在古诺产量竞争或者斯塔克伯格领导者-跟随者产量竞争情形下,管理层持股(MBO)比员工持股(ESOP)更能提高社会福利水平;当并购效率较高时,国有企业采用并购民营企业的方式实现混合所有制相比MBO和ESOP这两种方式更有利于社会福利水平的提高;(2)在伯川德价格竞争情形下,当混合所有制企业中国有股占比界于0~0.6,或者界于0.68~1时,采取MBO方式比ESOP更有利于社会福利的提高;当国有股占比界于0.6~0.68时,则应该鼓励以ESOP的方式实现混合所有制经营;但是,不管国有股占比和并购效率如何,采用并购民营企业的方式是最优的。Based on the perspective of social welfare maximization, this paper focuses on the choices of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises. The results show that ： （ 1 ） under the Cournot competition or the Stack- elberg leader-follower competition, the choice of management buy-out（MBO） can improve more social welfare than employee stock ownership （ESOP） ;when the merger efficiency is high enough, to merge with a private firm is more conducive to the improvement of social welfare compared with the MBO and the ESOP ; （2） under the Bertrand com- petition, when the state-owned shares accounted for 0 - 0.6 or 0.68 - 1, the choice of the MBO is conducive to improving social welfare than the ESOP; while when the state-owned shares is between 0.6 - 0.68, it should be encouraged for the form of the ESOP; how ever the state-owned shares and merger efficiency would be, to merge with a private firm is optimal compared to the MBO and the ESOP.

关 键 词：国有企业 混合所有制改革 并购 管理层持股 员工持股 

分 类 号：F271.1[经济管理—企业管理]