乳制品安全监管中的多阶段进化博弈分析  

Multi-stage Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Safety Supervision of Dairy Products

作　　者：李亘[1,2] 李向阳[1] 刘昭阁 LI Gen LI Xiang-yang LIU Zhao-ge(School of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin 150001, China Ministry of Finance of the People＇s Republic of China, Beijing 100820, China)

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨工业大学管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150001 [2]财政部国库司,北京100820

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2017年第6期49-57,共9页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金应急管理重大研究计划项目(91024028;91024031;91324018);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172156;71473058)

摘　　要：乳制品安全风险存在于生产与组织的多个阶段。在各个阶段中,政府监管部门虽统一监管,但由于采取的监管策略不同,使其与厂商之间的博弈情景存在差异,这将影响风险控制的成果。为探索多阶段监管的有效途径,找寻降低监管风险的方法,本文分析了乳制品安全监管中的多阶段进化博弈。首先阐述多阶段厂商监管的相关组织关系,构建进化博弈模型;其次基于模型进行进化博弈分析,分别得出了不同监管情景下的演化稳定策略,识别了多阶段策略选择的稳定条件;最后归纳了进化博弈分析结果,通过模拟仿真以及案例分析加以验证。The risk of dairy products＇ safety lies in many company-involved stages including production and organization. Although the governmental supervision department exercises a unified supervision, the game scenes between it and dairy companies vary from stage to stage because of the difference of supervision strategies, and that will influence the achievements of risk control. In order to explore the effective ways of multi-stage supervi- sion and seek approaches of reducing supervision risk, this paper analyzes multi-stage evolutionary game in the supervision of dairy products＇ safety. Firstly, we elaborate relevant organizational relationship in the multi-stage supervision and construct an evolutionary game model. Secondly, we make an evolutionary game analysis based on the model, obtaining the evolutionary stable strategies under different supervision scenes separately, and iden- tifying the stable conditions of multi-stage strategy selection. Finally, we conclude the results of the evolutionary game analysis and verify the results by simulation and case analysis.

关 键 词：乳制品安全 多阶段监管 进化博弈 风险控制策略 

分 类 号：X913[环境科学与工程—安全科学]