经理权力与高管薪酬激励——认知、机理与研究展望  

Manage Power and Executive Compensation Incentive——The Cognitive,Mechanism and Research Prospects

作　　者：吴士健[1] 权英[2] 刘新民[1] WU Shi-jian QUAN Ying LIU Xin-min(College of Economics and Management, Shandong University of Science and Technology , QingdaoShandong266590, China College of Humanities and Law, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao Shandong 266590, China)

机构地区：[1]山东科技大学经管学院,山东青岛266590 [2]山东科技大学文法学院,山东青岛266590

出　　处：《技术经济与管理研究》2017年第7期54-58,共5页Journal of Technical Economics & Management

基　　金：教育部人文社科规划青年基金项目(12YJC790155);第55批中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目(2014M551937);山东省优秀中青年科学家科研奖励基金项目(BS2013SF019)

摘　　要：文章系统回顾经理权力理论,分析经理权力的认知与度量,指出经理权力综合评价法的研究价值;并基于经理权力视角,解释高管薪酬失控及薪酬-绩效敏感性低的原因与机理,认为最优薪酬契约本身就是代理问题的一部分,拥有权力的经理会通过俘获董事会来影响薪酬制定,薪酬契约不能解决高管激励问题;为逃避监管,经理还可以通过权力影响公司并购投资、R&D投资等自由裁量性投资决策,进而提高薪酬制定的谈判力,降低薪酬-绩效敏感性。文章在既有文献梳理的基础上,对经理权力的认知、度量、薪酬效应和作用机理进行分析,并结合我国公司治理的具体情境,提出了中国情景下的经理权力研究、经理权力结构与来源、经理权力的感知测量、经理权力的作用机理和边界等新的研究议题。On the basis of systematically reviewing manager power theory, this paper reviews the acknowledge of manage power,and points out the research value of comprehensive evaluation of manager power. Based on the perspective of manger power, this paper presents the cause for executive compensation being out of control and low pay-performance sensitivity and proposes relevant mechanisms for explaining. As the authors of this paper, we believe that the optimal compensation contract itself has already been a part of agency problem, managers having power would influence compensation determination through getting the support of board of directors,and compensation contract cannot solve the problem in executive incentive. To evade supervision, managers can also influence the discretionary investments such as merge investment, RD investment through usage of power, so as to enhance their bargaining power in compensation determination and reduce pay-performance sensitivity. By reviewing existing literatures on this issue, this paper analyzes cognition, measurement, compensation effect and mechanism of action of manager power, and proposes new research issues according to China＇s national condition, such as structure and source of manager power, measurement of manager power awareness, action mechanism and boundary of manager power.

关 键 词：经理权力 公司治理 薪酬效应 行为效应 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理]