上市公司投机行为及其监管有效性研究  

Effect of Supervision over the Speculations of Listed Corporations

作　　者：冯锐[1] 申晨[2,3] 李胜兰[4] 

机构地区：[1]广州大学经济与统计学院 [2]浙江理工大学经济管理学院 [3]经济学博士 [4]中山大学岭南学院

出　　处：《南京师大学报（社会科学版）》2017年第4期68-78,共11页Journal of Nanjing Normal University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：广东省哲学社科十三五规划项目(GD16XYJ09)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：传统的学术观点认为完善的法律制度是抑制上市公司投机行为的主要手段。然而,法律制度不断完善的中国证券市场为什么仍然存在普遍的公司投机行为呢?法律制度中可实施的惩罚机制缺失是问题的关键。本文从法律制度实施的角度重新审视了上市公司投机行为与证监会监管稽查的有效性研究,发现在控制地方政府对上市公司利益诉求的情况下,证券稽查的执法力度能够有效降低上市公司预期的投机行为。在研究结论的基础上,我们提出具体的政策建议以利于抑制上市公司投机行为,更好地保护投资者权益。Traditionally, a perfect legal system is thought to be the main approach to curbing speculative behavior of the listed corporations. However, why do the company speculations still happen in securities market despite the improvement of Chinese legal system？ The crux of the problem lies in the lack of implementable punishments in the legal system. From the perspective of the implementation of the law, this paper re- examines the speculations of the listed companies and the validity of Securities Regulatory Commission＇s supervision. It is found that under the condition of putting under control the local governments＇ expectation of interests on the listed companies, a forceful supervision can effectively reduce the speculation committed by the listed companies. On this basis, we offer some concrete recommendations to curb speculation of the listed corporations in order to protect the rights of investors.

关 键 词：上市公司 机会主义 盈余操纵 证券稽查 

分 类 号：D922.287[政治法律—经济法学] D922.291.91[政治法律—法学]