安德森的民主平等及其不足  

On Anderson's Democratic Equality and Its Limits

作　　者：秦子忠[1] 

机构地区：[1]海南大学马克思主义学院,海南海口570228

出　　处：《中国石油大学学报（社会科学版）》2017年第4期69-74,共6页Journal of China University of Petroleum (Edition of Social Sciences)

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(15XNH120)

摘　　要：运气平等理论在事实上面临着没有给予弱者以真正平等尊重的困境。因为它的"敏于抱负、钝于禀赋"之基本主张不仅包含着贬低或羞辱申请者的可能性,而且允许对可责备的弱者不施以救助,即便他们处于不平等的社会关系中。摆脱这种困境的一个路径是安德森的民主平等理论。该理论主张只有维持和促进平等的社会关系才能对弱者表达真正的平等尊重,但是由于它没有恰当地处理弱者的个人责任信息,因而事实上也没有给予弱者以真正的平等尊重。Luck equality is in face of the difficulty that it treats the weak without real equal respect. Because its basic claim, i. e., ＂sensitive to ambition and insensitive to endowment＂ , may not only devalue or humiliate the weak who ask for aid, but also allow blamable unfortunate persons to fall into unequal social relation. One way to avoid the difficulty encountered by luck egalitarianism is E. S. Anderson＇s ＂ democratic equality＂ . It claims that only by promoting and keeping equal social relation can the weak obtain real equal respect. In virtue of incorrectly dealing with the responsibility information of the weak, however, democratic equality in fact treats the weak without real equal respect as well.

关 键 词：伊丽莎白·安德森 平等尊重 运气平等 民主平等 个人责任 

分 类 号：B152[哲学宗教—世界哲学]