规模经济的差异化竞争制造商集团采购的权力结构模型  

Power structure modeling for group purchasing with differentiated competing manufacturers under economies of scale

作　　者：周茂森[1,2] 但斌[1,2] 周宇[1] ZHOU Mao-sen DAN Bin ZHOU Yu(School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China Research Center of Business Administration and Economic Development, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400030, China)

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044 [2]重庆大学工商管理与经济发展研究中心,重庆400030

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2017年第3期192-200,共9页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272086);国家科技支撑计划资助项目(2012BAF12B09)

摘　　要：针对由一个集团采购组织(GPO)和两个差异化竞争制造商组成的集团采购供应链,考虑GPO以批量折扣价格集中采购某种部件,并以转移价格提供给制造商,然后各制造商分别将其加工为一种差异化替代产品。分别构建了集中决策下的基准模型,以及分别由GPO和制造商主导的两种权力结构博弈模型,并得到唯一均衡解。进而分析了权力结构、产品差异化、规模经济性等因素对均衡结果的影响,最后从供应链视角提出了两种权力结构在不同环境下的适用性和演化路径,并用数值算例予以考察。研究发现:集中决策下的最优产量和系统利润均随规模经济性呈单峰变化,分散决策在规模经济性足够高时可达最优;制造商主导的系统利润在规模经济性较低时高于GPO主导,而在规模经济性较高且产品差异化较大时低于GPO主导;制造商主导时可能无法实施集团采购,并且,当产品差异化较小时,还可能对制造商不利,而对GPO和系统有利。With the current market environment characterized by intense competition, high variability and diversified demand, an increasing number of manufacturers have chosen small batch production mode. In this context, group purchasing has been increasingly viewed as effective in reducing cost and improving performance. Through group purchasing, manufacturers can realize economies of scale by aggregating their purchasing volume. However, during the decision process of group purchasing, inappropriate power structure will result in incentive misalignment and efficiency reduction. To address this problem, we study a group-purchasing supply chain that consists of one group purchasing organization（GPO） and two manufacturers competing in quantity. The GPO purchases a common component from vendors with a quantity discount cost, then provides the component for each manufacturer at a corresponding transfer price. The manufacturers further process it to make imperfectly substitutable products. After considering power structure differences, and environmental factors, such as product differentiation and economies of scale, we constructed three types of models, including the centralized decision-making model and two Stackelberg game models dominated by the GPO and manufacturers, respectively. Based on the solutions, we derive the optimal quantity of the system for each manufacturer, and the equilibrium quantity and transfer price under each power structure. On this basis, we analyze the effect of environmental factors on the equilibriums, and consequently compare system profits under different power structures with numerical examples. Our study shows that both optimal quantity and system profit are increasing in product differentiation, but unimodal with respect to the economy of scale. The quantities under both power structures will not exceed the optimum, and can reach the optimum if the economy of scale is high enough. More interestingly, different from the GPO＇s dominance, the quantity under the manufacturers＇ dominance m

关 键 词：集团采购 权力结构 差异化竞争 规模经济 量折扣契约 

分 类 号：F270.5[经济管理—企业管理]