基于演化博弈的远程医疗服务推进  

Promoting Telemedical Services Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

作　　者：詹祥[1,2] 周绿林[2] 孙晓阳[3] 

机构地区：[1]南京医科大学医政学院,江苏南京210029 [2]江苏大学管理学院,江苏镇江212013 [3]江苏大学财经学院,江苏镇江212013

出　　处：《系统工程》2017年第2期95-102,共8页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(12BGL110);江苏省普通高校研究生科研创新计划项目(KYZZ 0296)

摘　　要：围绕推进远程医疗服务进程中的中心医院、远端医院和患者三个主要影响主体,借助演化博弈理论,构建三方演化博弈模型,利用复制动态方程解出三维动力系统的均衡点及演化稳定策略,并进行数值仿真模拟,演示不同数值对远程医疗服务推进演化结果的影响。研究结果表明:成本大于收益的情形下,行为主体将阻碍远程医疗服务的推进;收益大于成本的情形下,中心医院、远端医院和患者群体的良性互动有利于推进远程医疗服务。增加中心医院和远端医院的收益、提高患者接受远程医疗服务的效用、加大政府对中心医院和远端医院的资金支持及奖励、提高医保报销比例、减少中心医院和远端医院提供远程医疗服务的运营成本以及控制患者投诉成本、医疗费用等有利于远程医疗服务的推进。This paper establishes an evolutionary game model of promotion of telemedicine between center hospitals,telehospitals and patients based on the view of evolutionary game theory,and explored its evolutionary process,stable strategy and numerical simulation.This paper shows that the subjects will hinder the promotion of telemedical services when the costs outweigh the benefits,and the center hospitals,telehospitals and patients will promote telemedicine with their benign interactions when the benefits is greater than the costs.The results show that the promotion of telemedical services depends on the increase in income of center hospitals and telehospitals,the utility of patients receiving telemedical services,the increase of the government＇s financial support and rewards to the hospitals,improving the reimbursement ratio.Telemedicine can reducing the costs of center hospitals and telehospitals by providing telemedical services and controlling the complaints costs of patients whose medical expenses will also promote telemedical services.

关 键 词：远程医疗服务 三方主体博弈 演化博弈论 远端医院 

分 类 号：C935[经济管理—管理学]