异质股东对国企双重任务的偏好选择——董事会功能偏好的中介  

Preferences of Dual-Duty of Heterogeneous Shareholders in State-Owned Enterprises——The Mediating Role of Boards' Functional Preference

作　　者：刘新民[1] 于文成[1] 王垒[1] LIU Xinmin YU Wencheng WANG Lei(College of Economics and Management, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, Chin)

机构地区：[1]山东科技大学经济管理学院,山东青岛266590

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2017年第8期85-100,共16页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71371111;71471105);中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目(2015M5820019);山东省自然科学基金(ZR2016GB07);山东科技大学科研创新团队项目(2015TDJH103)

摘　　要：根据高层梯队理论和社会类化理论构建基于董事职能背景主导下的董事会功能偏好,实证揭示了中国国企股权混合所有制改革下四类股东对董事会功能偏好和双重任务的差异影响,以及通过董事会功能偏好影响双重任务的作用机理。研究发现,四类股东对于社会责任和企业绩效的影响作用不同,对于董事会功能偏好的选择也不尽相同;两类董事会功能偏好对企业双重任务的作用完全相异;不仅董事会功能偏好的中介作用存在,而且董事会功能偏好的中介效应随股东性质、企业任务的不同而呈现强弱差异。Based on the Upper Echelons Theory and Social Categorization Theory,this study develops the functional preferences of the board on the background of directors＇ funtions.We empirically reveal the differences of four types of shareholders and their functional preferences of dual duties under the mixed-ownership reform of shareholding in state-owned enterprises.The result shows that four types of shareholders have different influences on social responsibility,corporate performance and functional preferences of the board;and two types of board＇s functional preferences play totally different role on enterprises＇ dual duties.There exists the mediating effect,and it changes with different shareholders and enterprise duties.

关 键 词：异质股东 董事会功能偏好 双重任务 中介效应 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理]