中国上市公司股权激励实施效果研究  

The Implementation Results of SOP in China's Listed Companies

作　　者：唐雨虹[1] 周蓉[1] 杨啸宇[1] 杨玉坤[2] TANG Yuhong ZHONG Rong YANG Xiaoyu YANG Yukun(School of Economics and Management, Tibet University, Lhasa , Tibet, 850000, China School of Financial ＆ Accounting Studies, Xiarnen University, Xiamen , Fujian 361005, China)

机构地区：[1]西藏大学经济与管理学院,西藏拉萨850000 [2]厦门大学财务管理与会计研究院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2017年第4期57-61,共5页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：西藏科技厅重点科技计划软科学项目;西藏自治区哲学社会科学专项资金项目(16BJY005)

摘　　要：股权激励制度设计的初衷是为了减弱代理问题,因此考察股权激励的实施效果应该首先直接考察它能否缓解经理人的代理问题,然后才是对公司绩效的影响。利用2006—2014年我国沪深两市A股上市公司面板数据,从代理成本和公司绩效两个层面研究我国股权激励实施效果,结果表明:上市公司实施股权激励可抑制投资不足行为,却加剧了经理人的过度投资行为;股权激励计划并不能显著降低经理人的在职消费,由此而带来的以ROA衡量的公司绩效改善也并不显著,这从两个层面说明我国股权激励计划的激励效果并不明显。Stock Option Plan （SOP） was originally designed to weaken the agency problem, therefore we should examine whether it can alleviate the agency problem of managers directly to investigate the effect of the implementation of SOP, and then the impact on corporate performance.This paper studies the implementation results of stock option plan（SOP） in China from the aspects of agency costs and firm performance, using a 2006--2011 panel data of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share market. We find stock option plan can alleviate underinvestment behaviors significantly, while it exacerbates the overinvestment behaviors of managers. Stock option plan cannot decrease the non-pecuniary compensation, and hence the reduction of agency costs does not bring significant improvement of firm performance measured by ROA.

关 键 词：股权激励 过度投资 投资不足 在职消费 

分 类 号：F120.3[经济管理—世界经济]