高管权力强度、自愿性信息披露与公司业绩波动性--基于新三板公司的实证研究  

Executive Power Intensity,Voluntary Information Disclosure and Corporate Performance Volatility:An Empirical Study Based on NEEQ

作　　者：李慧云[1] 谭文惠[1] 张红璐 杨哲源 

机构地区：[1]北京理工大学管理与经济学院,北京100081 [2]伦敦政治经济学院财经会计系

出　　处：《统计与信息论坛》2017年第8期39-46,共8页Journal of Statistics and Information

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目<我国军工上市公司自愿性信息披露特征及重大影响的统计研究>(13ATJ003);国家自然科学基金项目<中国上市公司自愿性信息披露影响因素及监管研究>(71140006);第三次全国经济普查研究项目<基于工业经济转型升级的碳信息披露发展现状与影响因素研究"([JP]007);北京经济社会可持续发展研究基地资助

摘　　要：选取2010年至2014年新三板挂牌公司共330个观测值为研究对象,通过建立公司业绩波动性多元回归分析模型,实证检验公司自愿性信息披露水平对高管权力强度与公司业绩波动性关系的调节作用。研究结果显示:高管权力强度越大,公司业绩越高,公司业绩波动性也越大,高管权力的提高对新三板企业来讲"利弊参半",自愿性信息披露水平的提高能够削弱高管权力强度对公司业绩波动性的影响。This article selected 330 observations listed in National Equities Exchange and Quotations from 2010 to 2014 as the research object, using themodel of multiple regression analysis, to analyze the company’s horizontal industry performance volatility, and then research the different effects that the intensity of the executive power has on the performance volatility of the company under the effect of voluntary information disclosure. Through this research, we find that： The intensity of the executive power is significantly positively correlated with the performance of the company, but negatively correlated with the performance volatility of the company. So the improvement of executive power intensity for enterprises in NEEQ is a double -edged swordand the level of voluntary information disclosure can weaken the influence of the intensity of executive power on the performance of the company.

关 键 词：高管权力强度 自愿性信息披露 公司业绩波动性 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]