CEO过度自信、权力配置与股价崩盘风险  

CEO OVERCONFIDENCE,POWER CONFIGURATION AND STOCK PRICE CRASH RISK

作　　者：曾爱民[1] 林雯[2] 魏志华[3] 张纯[4] 

机构地区：[1]浙江工商大学财务与会计学院 [2]浙江工商大学杭州商学院 [3]厦门大学经济学院 [4]上海财经大学会计与财务研究院

出　　处：《经济理论与经济管理》2017年第8期75-90,共16页Economic Theory and Business Management

基　　金：教育部规划基金项目(15YJA630093);浙江省自然科学基金面上项目(LY15G020002);国家自然科学基金项目(71572165;71502166;71272011);国家社科基金重点项目(13AGL002);浙江省高校社科重点研究基地(浙江工商大学工商管理学科)重点项目(JYTgs20151301)的资助

摘　　要：基于沪深两市2006—2013年A股上市公司的面板数据,本文从行为金融视角出发考察了CEO过度自信心理特征及其权力配置对股价崩盘风险的影响。研究发现CEO过度自信会增大公司股价崩盘风险;并且,随着CEO权力增大,过度自信更容易导致公司股价崩盘现象发生。进一步将CEO权力细分为选择权和决断权之后发现,只有CEO决断权增大能显著加剧过度自信对股价崩盘风险的负面影响,且这一关系只有在选择权得到保证后成立。From the perspective of behavioral finance, this paper studies the impact of CEOs＇ overcon- fidence, CEOs＇ power and its configuration on stock price crash risk based on the 2006--2013 panel data of a-share companies listed in Shanghai Securities Exchange and Shenzhen Securities Exchange. Empirical evi- dence shows as follows. First, CEO＇s overconfidence increases the stock price crash risk. Second, the o- verconfidence is more likely to lead to share price collapse with the increase of CEOs＇ power. Third, after further subdividing the CEOs＇ power into decision power and choice power, we found that it＇s the CEO＇s decision power rather than choice power plays the main role on moderating the relationship between CEO overconfidence and stock price crash risk. While, even with the large decision power, CEO＇s overconfi- dence can＇t aggravate the negative effect on stock price cash risk with the restriction of choice power.

关 键 词：股价崩盘风险 过度自信 CEO权力 权力配置 

分 类 号：F272.91[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]