税收体制改革的政治经济学——来自1685年至1820年清代各直省摊丁入亩的历史证据  

The Political Economy of the Reform of Tax System: Historical Evidence from the Sharing Poll Tax with Land in the Qing Dynasty from 1685 to 1820

作　　者：何富彩[1] 

机构地区：[1]江西科技师范大学商学院

出　　处：《南开经济研究》2017年第4期73-92,共20页Nankai Economic Studies

摘　　要：本文利用摊丁入亩的地区差别及时间先后构造双重差分模型,估计结果表明,从平均意义上来说,推行摊丁入亩导致地方政府起运银占比下降。在添加摊丁入亩与耗羡归公交互项的稳健性检验中,本文进一步发现了摊丁入亩对起运银占比作用的渠道。摊丁入亩不过是简化中央对地方税赋监管的程序以及节省地方政府税收征收上的机会成本,而摊丁入亩基础上的耗羡归公改革则增强地方政府在税收征收上的激励。实证研究结果表明,摊丁入亩之后的税收征收成本的节省以及耗羡归公给予地方政府的财政激励最终强化了地方政府在财政上的自主权。This paper constructs the DID econometrical model using the regional difference on implementing the policy of sharing poll tax with land,and the result shows that the implementation of the reform of policy of tax lead to the decline of the proportion of central government tax.In the robust checks,after adding the interaction of the dummy variables of the sharing poll tax with land and the reform of the tax addition belonged to local government,the paper reveals the channel of the impact of the reform of sharing poll tax with land on the decline of the proportion of central government tax. The policy of sharing poll tax with land was only simplified the tax supervision from the central government and saved the collection cost of tax from the local government,but the reform of tax addition belonged to local government directly gave the local government economic incentives on the collection and regulation of tax. The paper argues that both the reform of sharing poll tax with land and the reform of tax addition belonged to local government affect the financial incentive of the local government,and ultimately strengthen the fiscal autonomy of local government.

关 键 词：摊丁入亩 耗羡归公 平均处理效应 财政竞争 

分 类 号：F812.9[经济管理—财政学]