独立董事官员背景类型与上市公司违规研究  

Independent Directors' Official Background and Corporate Fraud

作　　者：逯东[1,2] 谢璇[1,2] 杨丹[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学会计学院,611130 [2]西南财经大学工商管理学院,611130

出　　处：《会计研究》2017年第8期55-61,共7页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71672149;71620107005;71273212);教育部高等学校全国优秀博士学位论文作者专项资金资助项目(201493);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(JBK1407116)的资助

摘　　要：本文基于公司违规视角检验了两类官员型独立董事的监督功能。研究发现,聘任政府官员型独立董事的公司违规倾向更高,违规被稽查的概率更低;聘任高校官员型独立董事的公司违规倾向更低,违规被稽查的概率没有表现更低。进一步还发现,对公司过度投资发挥监督功能是官员型独董影响违规的重要传导路径;政府官员型独董背后的寻租能力是其监督失效的主要原因,而高校官员型独董则凭借其专业优势发挥了积极的监督作用。本文的经验证据表明,"18号文"的政策冲击导致的官员型独董的离职,一方面切断了公司通过聘任政府官员担任独立董事而建立政治关系的通道,有利于证券市场秩序的维护,但同时也将部分能够发挥积极监督作用的高校官员型独董排除在外。This paper investigates the monitoring role of independent directors with official background through corporate fraud and finds that,(1)Firms that hire government officials as independentdirectors are more likely to commit fraud but less likely to been detected;(2)Firms that hire university officials as independent directors are less likely to commit fraud but the probability of fraud detection is not lower.Further study shows the monitoring effect on overinvestment is the main conduction path through which directors with official background affect corporate fraud;rent-seeking function of government officials disables monitoring effects while university officials monitor effectively because of professional advantages.Our study shows that the dismission of official independent directors caused by the exogenous shock of"No.18 Document"cuts off political connections and maintains security market order,but also rules out those who can positively monitor firms.

关 键 词：独立董事 政府官员型 高校官员型 公司违规 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]