董事联结、董事会职能与并购绩效  

Interlocking directorates,board functions and M&A performance

作　　者：晏国菀[1] 谢光华[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《科研管理》2017年第9期106-115,共10页Science Research Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(编号:71372137;2014.01-2017.12);国家国家自然科学基金面上项目(编号:71172083;2012.01-2015.12);重庆市社会科学规划一般项目(编号:2016YBGL122;2016.11-2017.09);中央高校基本科研业务费(编号:CQDXWL-2012-186)

摘　　要：并购是推动创新经济,国企混改的重要途径。本文采用事件研究法、BHAR模型与非参数检验方法,从董事会职能的视角研究了联结董事社会声誉对公司并购绩效的影响。研究发现:声誉机制主要通过提升联结董事的咨询服务,降低并购双方之间信息不对称来改善并购绩效;目标公司信息越不透明或异地并购时,高声誉联结董事促进作用增强;而在委托代理问题严重的公司,监督职能受到限制,甚至低声誉联结董事可能在掏空严重的公司与管理层合谋,损害了并购绩效。本文的结果表明,应从加强声誉机制、改善公司治理入手,促进董事联结对并购绩效的积极作用。M＆A is an important approach to promote the development of creative economy and mixed ownership reform of state - owned enterprises. From the board functions perspective, this paper explores the influence reputation mechanism of interlocking directorates on firms＇M＆A performance, using event study, BHAR model and nonparametric tests. We find that high reputation has a significant and positive effect on M＆A performance mainly by improving advisory service of interlocking directorates and reducing asymmetric information. Furthermore, this effect is more significant when the target company＇s accounting information is more opaque or M＆A behavior occurs in different places. However, in a company which has a serious agency problem,＇ interloc- king directorates cannot play a supervisory role to improve M＆A performance. Even interlocking directorates that possess a low reputation may seize personal interests with management group and damage the value of M＆As. The results of this paper show that improvement of the positive effect of interlocking directorates on M＆A performance should be based on strengthening of directort reputation mechanism and improving corporate governance.

关 键 词：董事联结 董事会职能 董事声誉 并购绩效 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]