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机构地区:[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044 [2]重庆大学工商管理与经济发展研究中心,重庆400030
出 处:《管理评论》2017年第8期211-222,共12页Management Review
基 金:国家自然科学基金项目(71272086);国家科技支撑计划项目(2015BAF05B01);高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金(20120191110042)
摘 要:针对由一个制造商和一个销售服务集成商构成的产品服务供应链中服务促进销售的情形,本文基于博弈理论和优化理论构建了制造商和销售服务集成商的决策模型,分析、比较了分散决策和集中决策下产品服务供应链的最优产品价格、服务价格和服务水平。结论表明,产品价格的变化取决于客户对服务水平的敏感系数,制造商和销售服务集成商的利润与客户对服务水平的敏感系数呈正相关。从制造商和销售服务集成商合作的角度出发,提出一种使供应链利润实现优化的销售补偿-服务成本共担契约。最后通过数值仿真,论证了此契约能够优化产品服务供应链的利润,且当契约参数在一定范围时供应链双方都能达到利润的帕累托改善。In view of the situation where good service stimulates the product demand in the product service supply chain that comprises a manufacturer and a sales service integrator,we use game theory and optimization theory to establish the decision models of the manufacturer and the sales service integrator,comparatively analyze the optimal product price,service price and service level under decentralized and centralized decision models. Results show that the product price changes depend on customers' sensitivity to the service level,and the profit of the manufacturer and the sales service integrator is positively related to that sensitivity. From the perspective of cooperation between the manufacturer and the sales service integrator,we propose a cost sharing contract that leverages sales revenue compensation to improve the supply chain's profit. Finally,a numerical example is used to verify that the proposed contract can enhance the profit of the produce service supply chain and the supply chain partners can realize the Pareto improvement with the contract parameters in a certain range.
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