经理管理防御与企业风险承担水平——股权激励的调节作用  

Managerial Entrenchment and Risk Taking of Enterprises——Regulatory Effect of Equity Incentives

作　　者：吴建祥[1,2] 李秉祥[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安理工大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安710054 [2]西安财经学院统计学院,陕西西安710100

出　　处：《经济经纬》2017年第5期104-108,共5页Economic Survey

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71272118);中国(西安)丝绸之路研究院科学研究项目(2016SY19);陕西省教育厅专项科学研究项目(17JK1297)

摘　　要：基于委托代理理论中代理人风险规避与风险追逐假说,探讨经理管理防御与企业风险承担水平之间的影响机理和关系,考察股权激励对两者关系的调节作用。研究结果表明:经理管理防御程度越强,企业风险承担水平越低,说明经理人为了保持自身职位和个人利益最大化,表现出更多的风险规避行为;管理层股权激励程度与公司风险承担水平正相关;管理层股权激励对经理管理防御与企业风险承担水平的关系存在正向调节作用。股权激励能激励经理人选择更多风险承担行为。Based on the hypothesis of risk aversion and risk seeking of agents in the agent theory,this paper studies the relationship and influence mechanism about managerial entrenchment and risk taking of enterprises,and discusses the regulatory effect of equity incentives on the relationship. The results show that managerial entrenchment reduces the corporate risk taking,showing more risk aversion behavior in managers as a way of maintaining their position and maximizing their benefit. Managerial equity incentives have a positive correlation with risk taking,and have a positive regulatory effect on the relationship between managerial entrenchment and the corporate risk taking. Equity incentives can motivate managers to adopt more risk-taking measures.

关 键 词：经理管理防御 风险承担 股权激励 调节作用 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]