内部控制、大股东持股与资产剥离决策——来自A股民营上市公司的经验证据  

Internal Control,Large Shareholders and Divestiture Decision——Empirical Evidence from Private A-listed Companies

作　　者：曹满丹[1] 秦娜[2] 

机构地区：[1]马鞍山师范高等专科学校,安徽马鞍山243032 [2]河海大学文天学院,安徽马鞍山243032

出　　处：《安顺学院学报》2017年第4期121-124,共4页Journal of Anshun University

基　　金：安徽省社科研究基地项目"内部控制对于债务期限结构的影响研究"(项目编号:SK2015A074)的研究成果

摘　　要：文章以2011—2014年部分民营上市公司为研究样本,以资产剥离决策作为切入点,实证检验了不同的内部控制质量下,民营上市公司大股东持股对资产剥离决策的影响,并据此探讨内部控制是否可以抑制民营上市公司大股东影响,从而完善公司治理机制。研究发现内部控制质量高的公司,大股东影响是不显著的,而内控质量低的公司,大股东的影响是显著的。我们的研究表明完善民营企业内部控制机制,可以抑制大股东的影响,保护中小股东的利益,促进民营企业的良性发展。This paper takes the private listed companies in 2011-2014 as the research samples and the divestiture decision as the breakthrough point to test the effect of the large shareholders＇ ownership on the divestiture decision under different internal control quality.Indirectly,based on this analysis,we try to know if the internal control can reduce the impact of large shareholders of private listed companies,and improve the corporate governance mechanism.Our research shows that the influence of large shareholders is not significant if the level of internal control quality is high,and the influence of large shareholders with low internal control quality is significant.Our research shows that improving the internal control mechanism of private enterprises can inhibit the impact of large shareholders and protect the interests of small shareholders,and promote private enterprises to develop healthily.

关 键 词：大股东 内部控制质量 资产剥离 代理冲突 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]