财务困境中的CEO权力和银行贷款——基于中国ST上市公司的实证分析  

CEO Power and Bank Loans in Financial Distress—Empirical Analysis Based on the Listed ST Companies in China

作　　者：徐慧华 杨雄[2] 

机构地区：[1]福建师范大学 [2]福州大学

出　　处：《财务与金融》2017年第4期24-29,共6页Accounting and Finance

摘　　要：以2008-2016沪深未退市ST上市公司为样本,实证检验了在财务困境当中CEO对内控制力、政治关联、银行关系这些CEO权力对于银行贷款获取的影响。研究结果显示,在财务困境当中,CEO的对内控制力能够显著的帮助获取银行贷款,而CEO的银行关系、政治关联这两种外部影响力对于其获取银行贷款反而较难。进一步研究发现,CEO的对内控制力、银行关系对于企业获取银行贷款不因企业性质的不同而不同。政治关联在民营企业当中能够获取更多的银行贷款,但是在国有企业当中,由于其天然性的政治资源,CEO的政治关联并没有让企业业绩变好,反而让其陷入财务困境,降低了银行贷款规模。Based on the Shanghai and Shenzhen 2008-2016 non delisting ST companies as a sample, this paper conducts an empirical analysis of the influence of CEOs＇ powers like CEOs＇ internal control, political association and the relationship between banks for the acquisition of bank loans when the company is in financial difficulties. The results of the study showed that in financial distress, CEO＇s internal control power can significantly help to obtain bank loans, and the two kinds of external influence, banks association relations and political association make obtaining loans from banks even difficult. Further studies showed that the ability of CEOs＇ internal control power and banks association relations to obtain bank loans might be different due to the different nature of the enterprises. The political connection can get more bank loans in private enterprises, but in state-owned enterprises, because of the nature of political resources, political association of CEO could not improve the enterorise＇s oerformance, but let it fall into financial distress, thus reducing the size of bank loans.

关 键 词：财务困境 政治关联 银行关系 银行贷款 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]