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作 者:高咏玲[1]
出 处:《系统工程理论与实践》2017年第9期2297-2305,共9页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基 金:国家自然科学基金(71201177);北京高等学校青年英才计划项目(YETP0967);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(17YJC630027)~~
摘 要:针对供应商的可变成本和产品市场价的双重Knight不确定性,本文运用α-maxmin多先验期望效用和纳什讨价还价模型研究了供应商的定价问题,涉及固定价格、成本加成和参考市场价三种合同,剖析了供应商的乐观度和含糊度对这些定价决策的影响。结论表明,固定价格随着供应商对成本的乐观度的提高而降低,随着市场价的乐观度的提高而提高.成本(市场价)的乐观度决定着成本(市场价)的含糊度与定价结果的关系.参考市场价合同下,供应商的定价权威不影响目标价格与成本的乐观度的关系,但影响目标价格与市场价的乐观度之间的关系。上述研究为分析不确定环境下供应商的定价行为提供理论支持。This paper considers Knightian uncertainties in the supplier's variable cost and the product's market price and examines the supplier's pricing problem for three contracts (fixed-price, cost-plus and market-based pricing) by using the α-maxmin multiple-priors expected utility and the Nash bargaining model The impacts of optimism and ambiguity on pricing decisions are explored. Results show the fixed price decreases with optimism levels about the cost but increases with optimism levels about the market price. The impacts of ambiguity degrees about the cost (the market price) on pricing outcomes depend on the supplier's optimism levels about the cost (the market price). The supplier's negotiation power does not affect the relationship between the target price under the market-based pricing contract and optimism levels about the cost. But it determines the relationship between the target price and optimism levels about the market price. This study provides theoretical support for analyzing suppliers' pricing behaviors under uncertainty.
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