公平偏好下低碳供应链企业博弈及其仿真研究  

Analysis and Simulation of Game in Low-carbon Supply Chain Enterprises Considering Fairness Preferences

作　　者：范如国[1] 沈文英[1] FAN Ru-guo SHEN Wen-ying

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院

出　　处：《中国地质大学学报（社会科学版）》2017年第5期18-31,共14页Journal of China University of Geosciences(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目"全面深化改革视阈下社会治理体制与机制创新研究"(14ZDA062);国家自然科学基金项目"基于异质性主体行为的产业集群低碳演化模型及其仿真研究"(71271159);教育部人文社会科学研究专项课题"我国高等工程教育布局与产业发展协同对接的主要障碍;系统性机制及发展模式研究"(14JDGC012);国家自科基金青年项目"基于多主体仿真模型的碳排放权交易政策效果研究"(71601148)

摘　　要：基于经典博弈和行为博弈理论建立博弈模型,以供应链上低碳企业无公平偏好为参照,对比研究了低碳企业具有公平偏好时,消费者低碳产品购买倾向和政府补贴对供应链企业决策的影响。分析结果表明:低碳企业的总体效用受其公平偏好的影响较大,在不同的政府补贴水平或消费者低碳产品购买倾向下,其不公平厌恶程度对自身效用的影响也有显著差异;当某一行业低碳产品处于起步阶段时,如果政府补贴不足,那么低碳企业的总体效用将会随着其不公平厌恶程度的增大而愈发减少,将不利于低碳企业的长期发展。Based on the classical game theory and the behavioral game theory, this paper establishes a supply chain enterprises decision-making game model. Using the low-carbon enterprise without fairness preferences as a reference, it does a comparative study of the impact of consumers＇ purchase intention to low-carbon products and the impact of government subsidies on the decision of supply chain enterprises when the low-carbon enterprise is with fairness preferences. The results show that the utility of low-car- bon enterprise is greatly affected by the fairness preferences. Under different government subsidies level or consumer purchase intention to low-carbon products, the low-carbon enterprise＇s unfair disgust has different effects on its utility. In the infancy of an industry＇ lowcarbonization, if the government subsidy is insufficient, the utility of the low-carbon enterprise will decrease with the increase of the unfairness- aversion, which will be detrimental to the long-term development of the low-carbon enterprise.

关 键 词：低碳经济 公平偏好 购买倾向 政府补贴 行为博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]