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作 者:高孟立[1,2]
机构地区:[1]浙江树人大学浙江省现代服务业研究中心,浙江杭州310015 [2]浙江工商大学工商管理学院,浙江杭州310018
出 处:《科学学研究》2017年第9期1422-1433,共12页Studies in Science of Science
基 金:浙江省科技计划软科学重点基金项目(2016C25040);国家社会科学基金项目(14BGL197);杭州市哲学社会科学规划课题成果(Z17JC075)
摘 要:合作创新中企业专用性投资的存在和专业性知识所有权的转移,会诱发企业间的机会主义行为,而任何一方的机会主义行为都会对企业间关系产生一定的破坏作用。本文基于服务主导逻辑视角,运用交易成本理论、组织间关系理论,通过对182家KIBS企业合作创新项目问卷调研数据的实证分析,探讨了企业间机会主义行为的相互性影响,并深入剖析了契约治理、关系治理对企业机会主义行为及相互性的治理机制。结论表明:合作创新中企业间机会主义行为的相互性存在;契约治理、关系治理及其交互性都会直接抑制企业的机会主义行为;契约治理与关系治理的共同使用才能抑制企业间机会主义行为的相互性,但抑制效果随两者之间的组合而有所差异。The existence of enterprise specific investment and transfer of the professional knowledge ownership,can induce opportunism behavior between enterprises in the process of collaborative innovation. And the opportunism behavior of either party would damage to the relationship between enterprises. In this paper,from the perspective of service dominant logic,on the basis of transaction cost theory and organizational relations theory,with the questionnaire survey of the 182 KIBS enterprises collaborative innovation project data,the empirical analysis to explore the reciprocity influence of the opportunism behavior between enterprises,and analyses the governance mechanisms of the contract governance,relationship governance for opportunism behavior and the reciprocity. Conclusion shows that the reciprocity of opportunism behavior exist in the process of collaborative innovation; Contract governance,relationship governance and its interactive will directly inhibit enterprise opportunism behavior; The common influence of contract governance and relationship governance can restrain the reciprocity of opportunism behavior between enterprises,but the inhibition influence varies with the combination between the two.
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