网络上的非对称信息对抗及其纳什策略  

Asymmetric information countermeasure in networks and corresponding Nash strategy

作　　者：殷蓓蓓[1] 方蕴宇 宁高容 王宾[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京航空航天大学自动化科学与电气工程学院,北京100191 [2]中国航天科工集团第四研究院指挥自动化中心,北京102308

出　　处：《系统工程与电子技术》2017年第10期2270-2277,共8页Systems Engineering and Electronics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(61402027)资助课题

摘　　要：针对网络中的非对称信息对抗及其纳什均衡解的问题,考虑了系统中的随机扰动,并采用累积费用的思想来确定信息对抗中的费用函数。在所建立的信息对抗模型中,参与人包括不对等两方,即主导方和扰动方。其中主导方的目标是最小化其费用函数,且最小化其方差,而扰动方的目标则只是最小化其费用函数。通过分析随机微分博弈的纳什均衡解的充分条件,得到了退化的线性系统的分析解。最后用一个例子分析了非对称信息对抗中控制费用对控制效应的影响。According to the Nash equilibrium solution problem for asymmetrical information countermeasure in networks, an idea of cumulative cost is developed to analyze the cost functions in the case that the system subjects to stochastic disturbances. In this model of information countermeasure, players include two parties, namely, the control group and the disturbance group. The goal of the former is to minimize its cost function and its variance, but the goal of the latter is only to minimize its cost function. Moreover, the Nash equilibrium solution to each player is also given when the network system is linear based on the sufficient condition. Finally, an illustrative example is presented to show the characteristics of the asymmetrical information countermeasure in networks.

关 键 词：网络 非对称信息对抗 纳什均衡解 随机扰动 累积费用 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论] TP301[理学—数学]