浅析关系专用性投资与敲竹杠  

Analysis of Relationship-specific Investment and Hold-up Problem

作　　者：胡蓉[1] 张子明 HU Rong ZHANG Zi-ming(Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian 116025, China Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Langfang 065400, China)

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学经济学院经济系,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《黑龙江生态工程职业学院学报》2017年第5期34-35,125,共3页Journal of Heilongjiang Vocational Institute of Ecological Engineering

基　　金：辽宁省社科基金项目(L10DJL052)

摘　　要：关系专用性投资使投资接受方有采取敲竹杠的事后机会主义行为的倾向。敲竹杠问题作为现代契约理论的重要组成部分,其治理机制一直备受理论界关注。对关系专用性投资引起的敲竹杠问题及其治理机制进行梳理,综述已有的具有代表性的治理机制,并进一步探讨这些治理机制的局限以及未来发展可能面临的挑战。Relationship-specific investment make the investment recipient have tendenciesto adopt post opportunism.As an important part of the theory of contract,the governance mechanism has been paid much attention by theorists. Sort out the governance mechanism of the relationship-specific investment,summarize the existing representative governance mechanisms,and explore the limitations of these governance mechanisms and the challenges that future development may face.

关 键 词：关系专用性投资 敲竹杠 治理机制 

分 类 号：F272.91[经济管理—企业管理]