机构地区:[1]大连理工大学管理与经济学部
出 处:《中国工业经济》2017年第9期137-155,共19页China Industrial Economics
基 金:国家自然科学基金面上项目"双边集体声誉约束下的认证产业绩效提升机制研究"(批准号71373033);国家社会科学基金重大项目"加快我国传统产业向中高端升级发展的微观机制和政策创新研究"(批准号15ZDA025);辽宁省社会科学基金项目"面向辽宁制造业的研发服务业集聚发展模式与政策研究"(批准号L12DJY045)
摘 要:质量认证是治理"柠檬市场"问题的一种重要机制。本文针对当前中国很多行业都在引入认证机制的现象,首次以完善中国认证制度为出发点,通过理论模型和基于准实验匹配方法的实证检验,以淘宝网的金牌卖家认证为例,系统考察了本土认证信号导致的需求效应,及其与行业特征和卖家声誉之间的关系。研究发现,虽然中国曾经曝光出很多认证丑闻,但市场需求仍然会对新出现的有效认证信号做出反应,使得通过认证的高质量卖家能够获得销量的增加;认证给卖家带来的销量增加幅度与卖家所处行业的平均质量水平负相关,与行业竞争程度和产出平均价格正相关;低声誉卖家从认证当中获得的销量增长幅度高于高声誉卖家,认证机制的引入有利于高质量的新卖家进入市场,避免声誉机制失灵导致整个行业需求萎缩。此外,与获得认证给卖家带来的销量增长幅度相比,失去认证虽然会使卖家销量下降,但下降幅度相对较小。政府需在放宽认证行业准入的同时加大对认证机构的监管力度,根据行业特点和声誉机制的运行状况合理利用认证机制、提高认证标准,并加大认证信息在消费者一侧的宣传和披露力度。Quality certification is an important mechanism for the regulation of the "lemon market". In view of the phenomenon that a lot of industries in China have introduced the certification mechanism, for the first time to perfect China certification system as the starting point, this paper, through the theoretical model and empirical testing based on quasi-experimental matching method, taking Taobao gold-medal-seller certification for example, studies the demand effect from local certification signal and examines the roles that industry characteristic and seller's reputation played in affecting the demand effect systematically. This study found that although numerous certification scandals have been exposed in China, the market demand still responses positively to the new and effective certification signal, which significantly increased the sales of certified high quality sellers. The volume of increase in sales from the certification is negatively correlated with the average quality level of the seller's industry while it is positively related to competition level in an industry and the average price of the output. The low- reputation sellers obtained the growth rate of sales from the certification are higher than those certified high- reputation sellers. The introduction of the certification mechanism is conducive to enter the market for high-quality new sellers, and avoid the industry's demand to shrink due to the failure of the reputation mechanism. In addition, compared with the growth rate of sales derived from obtaining certification, the decline in sales from losing certification is relatively smaller. The government to relax the certification industry access, at the same time, needs to intensify the supervision of the certification bodies, use certification mechanism reasonably according to industry characteristics and the status of the reputation mechanism, raise the certification standards and increase the publicity and disclosure strength of certification information in the consumer side.
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