高管-独董任职联结与“机会主义”的费用粘性——基于独立董事外生离任所构建的拟自然实验  

Executive-Independent Director Employment Connection and Opportunistic Cost Stickiness——A Natural Experiment Based on the End of Independent Director's Term

作　　者：张俊瑞[1] 王良辉[1] 汪方军[1] ZHANG Jun-rui WANG Liang-hui WANG Fang-jun(School of Management, Xi＇an Jiaotong University, Xi＇an 710049, China)

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2017年第10期85-99,共15页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71472148);国家自然科学基金项目(71172186)

摘　　要：使用2003-2014年沪深两市所有上市公司数据,研究高管-独董任职联结对企业"机会主义"的费用粘性的影响。结果发现:(1)任职联结增加"机会主义"的费用粘性;(2)联结强度的提升进一步增加"机会主义"的费用粘性;(3)有效的公司治理机制可以减少"机会主义"的费用粘性,但任职联结削弱该治理效应;(4)由独立董事外生离任导致的任职联结破裂,减少了"机会主义"的费用粘性。Based on the data of listed companies in China from 2003 to 2014, we explore how the executive-independent director employment connection effects companies＇ opportunistic cost stickiness. The result shows that, （1） employment connection will in- crease opportunistic expense stickiness; （2） a reinforced associative strength will further increase opportunistic cost stickiness; （3）effec- tive corporate governance can reduce opportunistic cost stickiness, but employment connection will weaken this effect; （4） the end of independent director＇s term could break the connection and therefore decrease opportunistic cost stickiness.

关 键 词：裙带关系 社会网络 董事会治理 费用粘性 拟自然实验 

分 类 号：F726[经济管理—产业经济]