股权激励契约特征与企业创新  

Equity Incentive Contracts' Characteristics and Firm Innovation

作　　者：李丹蒙[1] 万华林 LI Dan-meng WAN Hua-lin(School of Business, East China University of Science and Technology, Shanghai, 200237, China School of Accountancy, Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting and Finance, Shanghai, 201620, China)

机构地区：[1]华东理工大学商学院,上海200237 [2]上海立信会计金融学院,上海201620

出　　处：《经济管理》2017年第10期156-172,共17页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"公开上市对企业创新活动的影响"(71502060);上海市浦江人才计划"独立董事履责机制;履责行为及经济后果"(16PJC064)

摘　　要：大量的经济学与管理学文献研究表明,以企业为主体的创新是经济增长的关键驱动力。而企业管理层是创新活动的主要决策者,其激励对于公司的创新活动至关重要。本文尝试探讨股权激励方案的实施以及不同激励方案的契约特征对企业创新活动的影响。基于中国上市公司2007—2014年度的数据,本文采用双重差分(DID)的研究思路,实证检验了我国上市公司股权激励方案的实施对公司创新活动的影响。本文研究发现,与对照样本相比,在股权激励方案实施后,样本公司研发投入和专利授予量均显著增加。本文研究还发现,上述影响因股权激励契约特征而异:股权激励方案的有效期越长,样本公司研发投入的增加越明显;实施股票期权类的方案及激励方案有效期越长的企业,所获发明专利的增加越明显;实施限制性股票及激励方案有效期越短的企业,其外观设计专利的增长越多。本文的研究结果表明,股权激励方案的契约结构对管理层实质性创新与策略性创新的动机选择具有重大影响。本文的研究发现对股权激励理论与实务均具有重要意义。Lots of literature in economics, finance, and been seen as one of the most important drivers of economic management show that innovative activities have always growth. The Incentive of corporate managers who are the main decision makers of innovation activities is vital to firm innovation. This paper focus on the equity incentive plans adopted by Chinese listed firms. Based on agency theory and other related theoretic framework in economics and corporate finance, the paper develops some hypotheses for testing. First, the paper gives a pair of competing hy- potheses on whether the adoption of equity incentive will enhance firms＇ innovative activities or not. Second, the pa- per digs into the effects of equity incentive contracts＇ characteristics such as incentivevtype （options or restricted stocks） ,incentive intensity （stocks granted through incentive contracts）,and incentive period （duration of the in- centive plans）on firms＇ innovation. Using data of 2007 to 2014 from Chinese listed firms, this paper examines the effects of equity incentive and the characteristics of incentive contracts on firm innovation. In order to reduce the concerns of self-selection and oth- er endogenous problems, this paper adopts a ＂ dynamic perspective ＂ instead of traditional association study. Specifically, this paper uses a research design of Propensity Score Matching （PSM） plus Difference-in-Differ- ence （DID）. In thepaper, firms adopted equity incentive contracts are seen as treated sample while those without a- doption of equity incentive contracts are treated as control sample. By using PSM, the paper choose a group of sub- sample firms from control sample to carefully match treated sample in order to reduce the endogenous concerns. The paper uses nearestvneighbor criterion for matching and controls a group of variables such as firm size, profitability, asset structure, growth, management compensation, ownership etc. After finishing the matching work, the paper runs a difference-in-difference regr

关 键 词：股权激励 契约特征 企业创新 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]