政府补贴与再制造设计下原始制造商与再制造商博弈模型  

Game Model between OEM and Remanufacturer Based on Government Subsidy and Designing for Remanufacturing

作　　者：夏西强[1] 

机构地区：[1]郑州大学商学院,河南郑州450001

出　　处：《系统工程》2017年第4期85-90,共6页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家杰出青年科学基金资助项目(71025002);国家重点基础研究发展计划项目(973;2011CB013406);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71472021;71702174)

摘　　要：为了分析政府不同补贴方式对再制造设计的影响,本文建立了原始制造商与再制造博弈模型。模型对比分析政府不同补贴方式对再制造设计努力程度、销售量、单位零售价格及销售利润的影响。研究结果表明:在原始制造商承担再制造设计费用,政府补贴给原始制造商不仅可以降低单位新产品与再制造产品的零售价格,增加新产品与再制造产品的销售量,还能增加原始制造商的销售利润和再制造设计的努力程度;在再制造商承担再制造设计费用时,政府补贴给再制造商虽然能降低单位新产品与再制造产品的零售价格,但是却减少了原始制造商的销售量与销售利润。This paper establishes a game model between an original equipment manufacturer（OEM）and a remanufacturer in order to analyze the effect of government subsidy on designing for remanufacturing between OEM and remanufacturer.It comparatively analyzes the effect of government subsidy on the level of designing for remanufacturing,quantity of sale,the unit retail prices and sales profits.The results show as follows：when the OEM charging for the fee of designing for remanufacturing,government subsidy to OEM can not only lower the unit retail price of both products,but also increase the sales of new products,sales profits of new products and the level of designing for remanufacturing;when remanufacturer charging for the fee of designing for remanufacturing,although government subsidy to remanufacturer can lower the unit retail price of both products,it reduces the sales of new products,sales profits of new products.

关 键 词：原始制造商 再制造商 再制造设计 政府补贴 博弈模型 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]