基于公平偏好的双渠道闭环供应链定价决策  

Pricing Decision in Dual-channel Closed-loop Supply Chain Based on Fairness Preference

作　　者：唐飞[1] 许茂增 

机构地区：[1]泸州职业技术学院商学院,四川泸州646000 [2]重庆交通大学经济与管理学院,重庆400074

出　　处：《系统工程》2017年第4期110-115,共6页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71471024;71402011);教育部人文社会科学研究西部和边疆地区项目(10XJA790009);重庆市教委科技资助项目(KJ070405)

摘　　要：在双渠道闭环供应链中考虑零售商具有公平偏好行为倾向,基于博弈理论研究了制造商考虑零售商公平偏好和不考虑零售商公平偏好的双渠道闭环供应链定价决策问题。结果发现,零售商的公平偏好行为对供应链各成员的最优定价策略和利润均有影响;与零售商不具有公平偏好相比,当零售商具有公平偏好时,如果制造商考虑这种公平偏好将增强零售商在双渠道闭环供应链中的讨价还价能力,这有利于增加零售商利润,但会减少制造商利润,而如果制造商忽视零售商的这种公平偏好将导致双方利润均减少;当零售商具有公平偏好时,处于主导地位的制造商应该关注这种公平偏好行为,从而避免双渠道闭环供应链系统效率的损失。The retailer＇s fairness preference behavior is incorporated in a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain to investigate the pricing decision problems of dual-channel closed-loop supply chain by considering and not considering the retailer＇s fairness preference of the manufacturer based on game theory.The results show that the retailer＇s fairness preference tendencies affect the optimal pricing strategy and profit of both the retailer and manufacturer.The profit would be increased for the retailer if the manufacturer considered retailer＇s fairness preference but reduced for manufacturer.If the manufacturer ignored the retailer＇s fairness preference,it was harmful for both sides.To avoid the efficiency loss of dual-channel closed-loop supply chain,the manufacturer as the leader should consider such preference behavior when the retailer has the preference of fairness.

关 键 词：双渠道 闭环供应链 博弈论 公平偏好 定价决策 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]