委托代理视角下城市建筑废料减量管理激励机制分析  

Analysis of Incentive Mechanism of Urban Construction Waste Reduction Management from the Perspective of Principal Agent Theory

作　　者：陈建国[1] 陈宝春 黄素萍[2] 

机构地区：[1]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092 [2]义乌工商职业技术学院,浙江义乌322000

出　　处：《建筑经济》2017年第10期66-69,共4页Construction Economy

摘　　要：应用委托-代理理论,梳理政府与施工企业之间的委托代理关系,然后通过构建政府与施工企业的委托代理模型,分析信息非对称情况下外生随机变量、风险规避程度及成本系数等因素对激励系数的影响,并对政府与施工企业的委托代理关系进行拓展研究。根据分析和研究结果,提出政府在设计建筑废料减量管理机制过程中必须考虑的因素。Using the principal-agent theory,the paper combs the principal-agent relationship between the government and construction enterprises. Through the principal-agent model of government and construction of construction enterprise,analyzes the influencing factors of asymmetric information under the exogenous random variable,the degree of risk aversion and cost coefficient on the incentive coefficient,and further researches the relationship between the government and construction enterprises agency. According to the analysis and research results,puts forward some factors that should be considered in the process of designing the construction waste reduction management mechanism.

关 键 词：委托代理 建筑废料 减量管理 激励机制 

分 类 号：X799.1[环境科学与工程—环境工程]