考虑非对称风险偏好的第一价格密封拍卖  

Considering asymmetric risk preferences of the first-price auction

作　　者：王春宝[1] 陈迅[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《重庆大学学报（社会科学版）》2017年第6期41-48,共8页Journal of Chongqing University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家发改委重点调研课题项目(XBS13-A01);国家社会科学基金项目(14BJY188)

摘　　要：在独立私人价值(IPV)框架下,文章构建了投标者风险偏好非对称的第一价格密封拍卖模型。基于分布函数相同前提,对强、弱两种风险规避度情形进行分析,研究发现:风险偏好非对称的第一价格密封拍卖存在非对称均衡投标策略且风险规避度强者投标更为激进;若风险偏好对称,则存在对称均衡投标策略,且强风险规避水平上的投标更为激进;对风险规避强弱的对称与非对称情形投标策略进行排序;拍卖的非效率性可能出现在风险偏好非对称的密封拍卖中,而风险偏好对称的拍卖总是有效率的。This paper studies first-price auction with asymmetric risk preferences firstly in a model with independent private values. Based on the independent identically distributed（ IID） hypothesis, we analyze two kinds of situations, the strong and weak risk aversion, and find that： 1） A first-price auction with asymmetric risk preferences has a monotonic equilibrium and the strong bidder bids more aggressively than the weak bidder. 2）With symmetric risk preferences, the first-price auction has a symmetric equilibrium and bidders bid more aggressively when their risk aversion are strong. 3） In the first-price auction with symmetric and asymmetric risk preferences, we sort the strong bidders and the weak bidders bidding strategies. 4） A first-price auction with asymmetric risk preferences may preclude allocative efficiency while the auction with symmetric risk preferences allocates efficiently.

关 键 词：第一价格密封拍卖 非对称风险偏好 拍卖效率 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]