存在服务搭便车问题时双渠道的冲突与协调研究  

Research on the Conflict and Coordination in Dual Channel Supply Chain under the Problem of Free Riding

作　　者：孙培英 王磊[1] 

机构地区：[1]青岛大学商学院,山东青岛266071

出　　处：《物流科技》2017年第11期1-3,共3页Logistics Sci-Tech

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目;项目编号:71202143;青岛市博士后应用研究项目;项目编号:2015173;山东省博士后创新项目;项目编号:201603064;山东省自然科学基金项目;项目编号:ZR2015GM001

摘　　要：针对电子商务环境下双渠道供应链存在的服务搭便车问题,制造商采用数量折扣契约应对。通过建立博弈模型,研究制造商采用数量折扣时搭便车系数对服务和利润的影响。研究发现:数量折扣契约虽然无法有效缓解搭便车效应对制造商的不利影响,但能够在一定程度上缓解对零售商利润、供应链整体利润以及服务的影响。For service free-ride problems of the dual-channel supply chain in the E-commerce environment, the manufac-turer uses the quantity discount contract. This paper con- structed a game model to study when manufacturer uses quantity discount contract, the profit and service how to change. The results showed： although the quantitative discount contract cannot effectively mitigate the adverse effects of the free-riding effect on the manufacturer, it can alleviate the im- pact on the retailer＇s profit, and the overall profitability of the supply chain and the service to a certain degree.

关 键 词：搭便车 双渠道供应链 数量折扣 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]