基于动态博弈的航空公司延误处置策略研究  

Research on Delayed Disposal of Airlines Based on Dynamic Game Theory

作　　者：陈伟玲[1] 邵荃[1] 程焰 张金石 

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学民航学院,南京210016 [2]中国民航科学技术研究院,北京100028 [3]中国民航新疆管理局,乌鲁木齐830016

出　　处：《河南科学》2017年第10期1696-1701,共6页Henan Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71573122;71303110);江苏省研究生培养创新工程项目(SJLX16_0117)

摘　　要：为优化航班延误情景中航空公司的价格策略,提高延误服务策略对旅客服务需求的响应水平,进而提高航空公司的竞争力,在考虑旅客社会属性和出行特征的基础上构建基于动态博弈的航空公司延误处置模型,应用劳斯-赫尔维茨(Routh-Hurwiz)定理分析博弈系统的稳定性,同时,运用Matlab仿真软件模拟不同参数组合条件下系统的动态演化过程和竞争态势,研究航空公司价格策略与延误服务策略对航空公司旅客流量变化和平均利润的影响.仿真结果表明,适当缩短博弈周期可规避竞争风险;考虑旅客属性特点及结构特征将促使航空公司制定更符合自身定位的价格策略及延误服务策略.In order to optimize the price strategy of the airlines in the flight delay scenario,to improve the responselevel of the delayed service strategy to the passenger service demand,and to improve the competitiveness of theairlines,to build the dynamic game based on the passenger social attributes and travel characteristics the stability ofthe game system is analyzed by using the Routh-Hurwitz theorem. At the same time,the dynamic evolution processand competitive situation of the system under different parameter combination conditions are simulated by Matlabsimulation software. The impact of the airline price strategy and the delay service strategy on the passenger trafficflow and the average profit of the airline. The simulation results show that the shortening of the game cycle can avoidthe competition risk;considering the passenger attribute characteristic and the structural characteristic will makethe airline develop the price strategy which is more in line with its own position and delay service strategy.

关 键 词：航班延误 延误处置模型 动态博弈 竞争策略 

分 类 号：V351[航空宇航科学与技术—人机与环境工程]