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作 者:陈小亮[1] 陈伟泽 CHEN Xiaoliang CHEN Weize(Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Department of Economics, Boston University)
机构地区:[1]中国社会科学院经济研究所 [2]美国波士顿大学经济系
出 处:《经济研究》2017年第10期98-112,共15页Economic Research Journal
基 金:国家自然科学基金青年项目(71603274;71703179);国家自然科学基金项目(71373266);国家社会科学基金重点项目(15AZD004)的资助
摘 要:政府补贴、自然垄断定价权和行政进入壁垒的存在导致中国产生了以上游国企垄断、下游非国企竞争为特征的垂直生产结构,并引发了企业之间的资本错配。本文构建了含有垂直生产结构和利率管制的动态一般均衡模型,研究了资本错配的产生机理。结果表明:在垂直生产结构之下,国企尤其是亏损国企不仅凭借垄断地位挤占了非国企在上游行业的投资空间,而且通过抬高中间品价格削弱了非国企在下游行业的投资动机,导致资本明显错配,而利率管制则强化了垂直生产结构的影响。借助利率市场化改革和国企改革(核心是消除行政进入壁垒),当经济体达到新的均衡时,国企和非国企资本错配的问题将会显著改善,总产出将增加24.2%,居民消费将增加66.9%。本文研究还表明,两类改革不应该先后进行,而应该同时推进。Summary: Capital misallocation is a prevailing phenomenon in developing countries including China. The allocation efficiency of capital in China has improved in parallel with the market economy. However, capital misallocation in China still widely exists across regions, industries, and firms, particularly between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs). The literature focusing on capital misallocation between SOEs and NSOEs raises two criticisms. First, most current studies only examine the effect of a single factor, e. g. , interest rate control, SOE subsidies, or monopolistic power, on capital misallocation, thereby failing to evaluate the overall effect of policy interventions. Second, previous studies are either based on the static framework of Hsieh & Klenow (2009) or on reduced-form econometric analyses. These approaches are unable to fully characterize dynamic effects in a varying environment with firms' entry and exit. To address these issues, this paper develops a quantifiable dynamic general equilibrium model of firm dynamics akin to Hopenhayn (1992) that accounts for interest rate control and vertical production structure, and inspects the mechanisms of capital misallocation between SOEs and NSOEs. Resulting from SOE subsidies, monopolistic pricing power, and upstream entry barriers, the vertical production structure defined in this paper is the one under which monopolistic SOEs take control at upstream industries, while NSOEs compete at downstream industries. The dynamic general equilibrium approach enables to not only inspect the interdependent mechanisms of multiple factors, but to also take firms' entry and exit decisions into account to characterize capital misallocation across firms, particularly between SOEs and NSOEs in a dynamic context. We show that under the vertical production structure, SOE subsidies, monopolistic pricing power, and upstream entry barriers lead to sizable capital misallocation. Our quantitative results imply that ups
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