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机构地区:[1]中国人民大学国际学院,北京100872 [2]北京市君泽君(深圳)律师事务所,广东深圳518026
出 处:《浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版)》2017年第5期226-240,共15页Journal of Zhejiang University:Humanities and Social Sciences
基 金:中国人民大学科学研究基金(11XNF011)
摘 要:对内部人反向刺破构成要件的研究可以沿用传统刺破的"主体—行为—结果"三要件框架。在主体方面,内部人反向刺破的权利主体既可以是公司自身,也可以是股东,包括自然人和母公司;责任主体则为公司债权人。在行为方面,公司股东对公司实行了过度控制的行为,这种过度控制是中性的,不存在利用公司法人格牟取不当利益的主观恶意,是股东为了方便管理、经营而实施的,或者因公司经营与股东生活紧密相连而产生的。在结果方面,包含三个递进层面:股东与公司人格上实质同一;责任主体债权的强制实现将违背重要公共政策或法律的特别规定;反向刺破给公司债权人带来的损失要小于其所促进的社会公共利益。The constitutive elements of "Insider Reverse Piercing of the Corporate Veil (RVP-I)" include three parts, namely, subject element, behavior element and consequence element. With respect to subject element, the subjects of RVP-I include subjects of right and subjects of liability. A subject of right could be the corporation itself or its individual shareholder(s) or a patent company; while a subject of liability refers to creditors of a corporation, whether they are voluntary or involuntary ones. With respect to behavior element, a shareholder must have conducted behaviors of excessive control over the corporation to be pierced if any subject of right intends to apply for the use of RVP-I. Such excessive control over the corporation shall be neutral and a sum of a series of factual behaviors. It shall not be out of subjective malice of any shareholder, who may seek illegal interests by taking advantages of corporate personality. Instead, such control should be conducted just for the convenience of corporate management and operation, or due to the close connection between the corporate operation and the daily life of the shareholder (s). Consequence element contains three sub-elements featuring a progressive relationship with each other as below: Firstly, the relationship between a shareholder and the corporation to be pierced has reached a de facto status in which the personalities of the two became completely identical in essence due to the shareholder's excessive control over the corporation. Secondly, some inequitable consequences against critical social policies or special legal rules (such as the loss of basic life dependences by a shareholder) will be caused by enforcement of a creditor's rights. Finally, the losses or adverse effects caused by RVP-I to a creditor of the corporation are less than the public interests which will be promoted by granting the corporation some legal privileges or immunities that can only be enjoyed by its shareholder(s). In this paper, the greates
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