CEO权力、风险承担与公司成长性——基于我国上市公司的实证研究  

CEO Power,Risk-taking and Corporate Growth——An Empirical Study of China's Listed Companies

作　　者：李海霞[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学城市学院,大连116600

出　　处：《管理评论》2017年第10期198-210,共13页Management Review

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目(14CJY073);辽宁省社科规划基金项目(L16BGL009)

摘　　要：本文对我国A股上市公司CEO权力、风险承担与公司成长性之间的关系进行了实证研究。研究发现:CEO权力与公司风险承担正相关;与非国有上市公司相比,CEO集权对风险承担的影响在国有上市公司中更加突出;进一步,公司风险承担对公司成长性具有显著的拖累效应,即风险承担水平越高,公司成长性越差;风险承担的这种拖累效应在国有上市公司中表现地更为显著。本研究对于制约上市公司尤其是国有上市公司CEO集权、合理控制风险、提高公司成长性等问题提供了一定的理论支持和解决思路。Based on the data of China＇s A-share listed companies,we conduct some empirical studies and reach the following conclusions on the relationship among CEO power,risk-taking and corporate growth：（ 1） the more power a CEO has,the higher risk his company companies will face;（ 2） the effect of CEO power on corporate risk-taking in state owned companies is higher than that in non-state owned companies;（ 3） further,the risk-taking has a significant drag effect on corporate growth,that is to say,the higher risk a company faces,the worse its growth will be;（ 4） the negative effect of corporate risk-taking on corporate growth in state owned companies is more significant than that in non-state owned companies. This study provides some theoretical basis and solutions for listed companies,especially listed SOEs,to effectively prevent the over-centralization of CEO＇s power,take reasonable control of corporate risk-taking and improve corporate growth.

关 键 词：CEO权力 风险承担 公司成长性 拖累效应 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理] F272.91[经济管理—国民经济] F832.51