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出 处:《重庆理工大学学报(社会科学)》2017年第10期86-91,114,共7页Journal of Chongqing University of Technology(Social Science)
摘 要:为优化公司股权结构和内部治理结构,规范内外部环境,提高企业价值,从第二类委托代理视角出发,以终极控制权结构的特征变量:终极控股股东的现金流权、终极控制权与现金流权的分离度、终极控制权性质和终极控股股东控制链层级入手,研究在股权集中的控制权结构下,终极控股股东的经营决策对企业风险承担的影响。Enterprise risk taking is the willingness to pay for the high profits and improving the value of the enterprise. At present,enterprise facing with changeable economic environment,how to effectively select high-yield project is the key to promote enterprise development; efficient decisionmaking focuses on enterprise overall strategy,pays attention to enterprise overall efficiency,and ensures that enterprise operating safely. So,the article starting from the second category of principalagent perspective,with the characteristic variables of the ultimate control structure: cash flow rights of ultimate controlling shareholders,the separation of cash flow right and ultimate control,the nature of ultimate control and the control chain level of ultimate controlling shareholder. Under the equity concentration of centralized control structure,it studies the influence of the centralized control of ultimate controlling shareholder on the business decision for enterprise risk-taking.
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