考虑产品多样性下制造商的在线定制策略选择研究  

The Manufacturer's Strategy Choice of Online Customization Channel Considering Product Variety

作　　者：刘咏梅[1] 杨如益 范辰[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院,长沙410083

出　　处：《软科学》2017年第11期123-127,138,共6页Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71271219;71071164;71210003;71431006);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-11-0519)

摘　　要：利用环型城市模型对单制造商和单零售商的两级供应链进行建模,探究考虑产品多样性下制造商增设在线定制渠道的市场条件,并比较不同博弈主导结构下相应结论的差异。研究发现无论标准产品多样性成本和消费者在线渠道接受度的高低,制造商都有可能会增设在线定制渠道,此策略能实现帕累托改进,但可能会加强双重边际化效应;不同博弈主导结构下增设在线定制渠道的条件不同,零售商主导下制造商选择定制化策略的动机更强烈,而且博弈的主导者不一定绝对占优。通过数值分析发现制造商选择在线定制策略的动机随额外定制成本和消费者在线定制渠道接受度的增大而减弱;而随传统渠道边际销售成本和消费者不匹配成本的增大而加强。Based on the circular spatial market model,this paper develops a two-echelon supply chain model consisting of one-manufacturer and one-retailer. It explores the market conditions considering the product variety,and compares the related conclusions under different leadership structures. The results show that the manufacturer may add online customization channel regardless of the variety cost of standard product and the acceptance rate of online customization channel. The customization strategy leads to a Pareto improvement in any leadership structures,but may cause double-marginalization effect.The manufacturer has a stronger incentive to adopt the customization strategy in retailer-Stackelberg game. The theoretical and numerical analysis suggests that the motivation to open an online customization channel decreases in the cost of custom and the acceptance in online customization channel,and increases in margin selling cost of the retailer and the misfit cost in standard products.

关 键 词：在线定制 双渠道 产品多样性 博弈主导结构 环型城市模型 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]