面向关键设备维修服务的性能合同与中断保险联合优化设计  

Designing the performance-based contracting and business interruption insurance for the maintenance services of mission-critical equipment

作　　者：秦绪伟[1,2] 康万根 蒋忠中[1,2] 杨玉佩[1] QIN Xuwei;KANG Wangen;JIANG Zhongzhong;YANG Yupei(School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110819, China;Institute of Behavioural and Service Operation Management, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110819, China)

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,沈阳110819 [2]东北大学行为与服务运作管理研究所,沈阳110819

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2017年第11期2821-2832,共12页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71472034;71371190;71671033);中央高校基本科研业务费(N160601001)~~

摘　　要：近年随着设备制造业服务化快速推进,性能合同(PBC)成为关键设备运营商与供应商之间的新型主流服务合同选项,它是根据服务性能结果给予供应商补偿.关键设备往往是运营商获得生产收益的根本来源,突发长时停机故障可能导致运营商的巨额收益损失以及资金流风险.面对PBC合同固有道德风险和突发故障严重损失,PBC合同如何设计才能激励供应商、是否购买保险作为信任担保和中断风险缓解策略,成为关键设备运营商急需解答的关键问题.本文以由备件库存与维修中心构成的闭环服务过程整体外包为例,引入营业中断保险(BI),以委托一代理理论为建模框架,研究PBC合同与BI保险集成设计方法,探讨两者之间相互作用机制,调查运营商购买BI保险决策条件.该研究是维修服务运作与保险领域跨界研究的首次尝试,其理论分析结果有助于为关键设备运营企业跨部门决策提供指导.With an ongoing trend towards the servitization of equipment manufacturing significantly, performance-based contracting （PBC） is currently becoming the main contract option between the firm operating mission-critical equipment and its supplier, where the supplier receives compensation based on realized availability. The high availability of mission-critical equipment is of the utmost importance to the profitability of the firm, the unexpected disruptions result in severe losses of profitability and potentially financial consequences. At risk to the inherent moral hazard of the PBC and the unbearable disruptions losses, the firm has an urgent appeal to solve how to design the PBC for incentivizing the supplier and whether or not to purchase insurance coverage for hedging disruptions losses and committing credible role. This study focuses on outsourcing the closed-loop service chain consisting of spares inventory and the repair facility. Business interruption insurance （BI） is firstly introduced, the design model integrated the PBC and the BI insurance is proposed in the framework of the principal-agent contracting. The interplay mechanism between operations and insurance is explored, and then the critical condition for purchasing the BI insurance is investigated. The study is a first attempt on the understanding of theinterplay between operation and insurance in the maintenance service of the mission-critical equipment. The theoretical results contribute to the decision-making of the operation-finance interface in the firm operating mission-critical equipment.

关 键 词：关键设备 性能合同 营业中断保险 运作-金融跨界研究 委托-代理理论 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]