零售商竞争下考虑产品商誉的纵向联合促销微分博弈  

Differential game on vertical joint promotion considering goodwill and retailers' competition

作　　者：王道平[1] 李小燕[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京科技大学东凌经济管理学院,北京100083

出　　处：《控制与决策》2017年第12期2210-2218,共9页Control and Decision

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71172169)

摘　　要：将产品商誉作为状态变量,借助微分博弈研究由单个制造商和两个竞争性零售商组成的供应链纵向联合促销问题.在产品需求受商誉和零售商促销努力的共同影响下,分别构建集中式和分散式微分博弈模型,引入成本分担契约对供应链进行协调,并通过算例对相关参数进行灵敏度分析.研究表明:成本分担契约的引入可提高零售商促销努力水平、产品商誉以及需求量,实现供应链协调;随着零售商竞争程度以及促销努力成本系数的增加,引入契约后供应链成员的利润增加值呈下降趋势;相反,随着零售商促销努力以及产品商誉对需求影响程度的增加,供应链成员的利润增加值呈上升趋势.With the aid of differential game, the vertical joint promotion problem of a supply chain consisted of a single manufacturer and two competitive retailers is studied, in which the goodwill is used as a state variable. In the case that the demand of products is affected by goodwill and retailers＇ promotion, centralized and decentralized differential game models are constructed. The cost-sharing contract is introduced to coordinate the supply chain. Furthermore, the sensitivity analysis of related parameters is conducted by using the numerical simulation method. It is found that, by introducing the cost-sharing contract, the promotion effort, the goodwill and the demand of products are promoted. The coordination of the supply chain is achieved. Meanwhile, with the increasing of the retailers＇ competition degree and the cost coefficient of promotion effort, the added profit of the supply chain members with the contract presents a declining curve. On the contrary, with the increasing influence of retailers＇ promotion effort and the goodwill on the demand, the added profit of the supply chain members with the contract is on the risen.

关 键 词：竞争 产品商誉 促销努力 微分博弈 成本分担契约 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]