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机构地区:[1]浙江工商大学财务与会计学院,浙江杭州310018 [2]浙江工商大学浙商研究中心,浙江杭州310012 [3]浙江大学管理学院,浙江杭州310058
出 处:《商业经济与管理》2017年第11期60-72,共13页Journal of Business Economics
基 金:教育部人文社会科学基金项目(16YJA630043);浙江省高校人文社会科学重点研究基地(浙江工商大学工商管理学科)项目(JYTgs20151304)
摘 要:公司为激励高管总的薪酬成本包括显性货币薪酬和隐性在职消费。作为保障公司正常运转降低内部各层级代理风险的内部控制,实证分析发现高质量的内部控制能够提高高管显性货币薪酬业绩敏感性,增强显性货币薪酬激励契约对隐性在职消费激励契约的替代性,并能提高在职消费的激励效率,但在产权性质不同的企业中内部控制对高管薪酬激励契约有效性的影响存在一定的差异。文章结论彰显了公司加强内部控制建设对提高高管薪酬激励契约有效性的重要性。The executives' total compensation incentive costs include the explicit monetary compensation and the implicit perks.As a protection to reduce the risk of the internal agency for the normal operation of these companies,we find that the high-quality internal control can increase these executives' monetary pay performance sensitivity,and increase the replacement of the implicit perks with the explicit monetary compensation,and also increase the incentive efficiency of the perks. However,there are some differences in the effect of the internal control on the effectiveness of the executives' compensation contract in these companies with the different property rights. The conclusion of this study highlights the importance of strengthening the internal control system in order to enhance the effectiveness of the executives' compensation incentive contract.
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