企业金融化、高管股权激励与研发投资  

Corporate Financialization,Executive Equity Incentive and R&D Investment

作　　者：晋盛武[1] 何珊珊 

机构地区：[1]合肥工业大学经济学院,安徽合肥230601

出　　处：《科技进步与对策》2017年第22期78-84,共7页Science & Technology Progress and Policy

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71273082)

摘　　要：以2010-2015年沪深584家A股上市公司为样本,从产权异质性角度考察企业金融化、高管股权激励与研发投资关系。研究发现:(1)非货币金融资产持有比例与研发投资呈负相关,反映企业金融化对研发投资具有挤出效应,且高管股权激励能弱化企业金融化与研发投资的负向关系。挤出效应和弱化效应在投资性金融资产上体现非常明显,而在交易类金融资产上体现不明显;(2)与非国有企业相比,非货币金融资产的挤出效应和高管股权激励的弱化效应在国有企业中表现更为显著。投资性金融资产的挤出效应在国有企业中较为显著,而在非国有企业中不太显著,但高管股权激励的抑制作用在国有或非国有企业均较为明显。不论产权异质性,交易类金融资产的挤出效应和高管股权激励的抑制作用均不显著。Based on the perspective of ownership heterogeneity,taking the samples of 584 Chinese public listed companies from 2010 to 2015,the paper analyzes the relationship among corporate financialization,executive equity incentive and RD investment.The results are as following：（1）proportion of non-monetary financial assets holding is negatively correlated with RD investment,suggesting that corporate financialization do curbs RD investment and executive equity incentive will weaken the negative relationship between corporate financialization and RD investment;crowd-out effect and weakening effect is obvious for investment financial assets,but not obvious for trading financial assets;（2）compared with non-state-owned enterprises,crowd-out effect of non-monetary financial assets and weakening effect of executive equity incentive are more significant in state-owned enterprises;crowd-out effect of investment financial assets is more obvious in state-owned firms,but not significant in non-state-owned enterprises,and executive equity incentive has inhibitory effect on state-owned or non-state-owned firms;regardless of ownership heterogeneity,crowd-out effect of trading financial assets and inhibitory effect of executive equity incentive are both inconspicuousness.

关 键 词：企业金融化 高管股权激励 研发投资 挤出效应 产权异质性 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理]