吹哨制度作用机制及政府激励制度研究  

Study on Mechanism and Incentive System of Whistle-blowing

作　　者：乔慧[1] 张曼 郑风田[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学农业与农村发展学院,北京100872 [2]罗格斯大学环境与生物学院,美国新泽西州08901

出　　处：《郑州航空工业管理学院学报》2017年第6期32-41,共10页Journal of Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71173225)

摘　　要：分别从政府层面、消费者层面分析并验证了吹哨制度缓解食品市场信息不对称的作用机制。结果表明,政府层面上,吹哨制度可以促进企业提高努力水平,同时降低政府监管成本。消费者层面上,吹哨制度可以影响消费者需求,从而降低消费者风险暴露。研究进一步分析了在现有的制度环境下,为保证企业内部吹哨者不与企业合谋、不过度吹哨,政府的奖励需设置在一个合理范围内。该范围与当前相关部门的责任认定水平相关,当责任认定水平越高时,激励的合理范围越广。而当责任认定水平较低时,激励制度的设计需要更加谨慎,以防止吹哨者与企业合谋,以及吹哨者过度吹哨现象,同时证明降低吹哨成本也是促进企业内部人员进行准确吹哨的重要前提。This paper analyses the mechanism of Whistle - blowing to alleviate information asymmetry in food market. Result shows that Whistle - blowing can improve the effort level of enterprises, and reduce the cost of government regulations. Whistle - blowing also can change consumers＇ demand, reduce the risk expose of consumers. Furthermore, to ensure whistleblower not to collude with enterprises and not to whistle excessively, government incentives required to set within a reasonable range, which has strong relationship with current responsibility identified level of the government. Moreover, the study also shows that reducing the cost of whistleblower is an important prerequisite for accurate Whistle - blowing.

关 键 词：食品安全 信息不对称 吹哨制度 政府激励制度 

分 类 号：F426.82[经济管理—产业经济]