基于补贴限制的双渠道合作广告模型  

Dual-channel Cooperative Advertising Model Based on Subsidy Constraints

作　　者：陆媛媛[1] 刘佳雨 

机构地区：[1]吉林师范大学数学学院,吉林四平136000

出　　处：《吉林师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2017年第4期66-75,共10页Journal of Jilin Normal University:Natural Science Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71501082)

摘　　要：双渠道供应链协调问题一直是一个研究热点,为了减小渠道冲突,大多数企业采用了合作广告这种方式.对于进行双渠道销售的制造商而言,直销渠道能获利的情况下,受到利润水平或产品销量的约束,以及双渠道的交叉影响,制造商对零售商广告花费的补贴不会源源不断,没有限制.从双渠道供应链角度出发,考虑制造商主导下的二级供应链,建立了基于广告补贴限制的制造商和零售商的最优广告决策模型,分析广告补贴约束对供应链成员最优广告决策的影响.Dual channel supply chain coordination has become a hot research question,cooperation advertising as a way to ease channel conflict,is adopted by more and more enterprises. For manufacturers in the dual channel marketing can make a profit form direct marketing channels,they will not provide unlimited subsidies to retailers＇ advertising spending for the constraints of profit levels or product sales,and the cross effect of double channels. This paper establishes the optimal advertising decision model of the manufacturer and the retailer,and analyzes the influence of the advertising subsidy constraints on the optimal advertising decision in a dual-channel supply chain.

关 键 词：双渠道 合作广告 补贴限制 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]