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出 处:《工业技术经济》2018年第1期57-64,共8页Journal of Industrial Technological Economics
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目"差异化支付行为影响下的网购供应链协调机制研究"(项目编号:71671054);国家自然科学基金资助项目"顾客导向型供应链竞合网络协调及突变应对研究"(项目编号:71371061)
摘 要:在支付多样化环境下,考虑第三方支付促销对顾客效用的影响,本文构建了受促销和价格影响的顾客效用函数,建立了引入顾客效用的三级供应链利润模型。利用Stackberg博弈分析供应链主体间最优决策,并与集中模式下进行对比,为了促使零售商降低零售价格来提高顾客效用,构建了批发价格下"促销成本共担+收益共享"契约达成供应链协调。最后通过数值分析证明:集中模式下顾客效用比独立决策下大;建立的契约机制能够实现制造商主导下的供应链协调;促销力度的增大有效增加了顾客效用。In the circumstances of diversification of payment, considering the effect of third party payment promotions onconsumer utility, this paper constructs a consumer utility function influenced by the promotion and price, a profit model for a two-stage supply chain consists of a retailer and a mamufacturer is built. By employing Stakeberg game, each supply chain members? op?timal decision is analyzed under decentralized setting and compared with centralized setting. In order to encourage retailer to lowerthe price, A “promotion cost & revenue sharing” contract is designed to ensure supply chain coordination. Finally, the numericalexamples show that the consumer utility of centralized decision is bigger than decentralized decision; the “promotion cost & revenuesharing” contract is effective; increase promotional efforts can effectively incease consumer utility; profit.
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