多制造商竞争下基于纵向联盟的收益共享契约  

Revenue Sharing Contract Based on Vertical Alliance under Competing Manufacturers

作　　者：许丽霞[1,2] 徐琪[1] 刘续[1,2] XU Li-xia;XU Qi;LIU XU(School of Business and Management, Donghua University, Shanghai 200051,China;Ningxia University, Yinehuan 750021 ,China)

机构地区：[1]东华大学旭日工商管理学院,上海200051 [2]宁夏大学,宁夏银川750021

出　　处：《系统工程》2017年第5期101-108,共8页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71572033;71172174)

摘　　要：考虑纵向联盟环境下,基于两个制造商与一个占优零售商构成的数量竞争模型,以批发价格合同作参照,研究零售商与制造商形成纵向联盟的条件及单联盟和多联盟下收益共享合同的选择,分析了产品竞争强度对联盟形成和瓦解以及供应链各方利润分配的影响。研究结论表明,批发价格契约下零售商与制造商无法达成纵向联盟,而采用收益共享契约,零售商和制造商均能达到形成单联盟和多联盟的条件。单个制造商与零售商形成的单联盟选择不受产品竞争强度的影响,而多个制造商与零售商形成的多联盟随产品竞争强度的增大而瓦解成单联盟的情况,且多联盟的瓦解只与零售商有关,与制造商无关。Based on vertical alliance,we propose quantity competition models by two competing manufacturers and one dominated retailer.Compared with wholesale price contract,this paper investigats the valid mechanism for vertical alliances formation and the range of revenue sharing contract and also analyzes the impact of product competition and price risk on the choice of alliances and revenue sharing contract.The results suggest that the wholesale price contract can not realize the vertical alliance between the manufacturers and the retailer,but the retailer and the manufacturers can form a single vertical alliance or more vertical alliances with the revenue sharing contract.The alliances are dependent on the intensity of product competition whereas independent of price risk.However,the proportion range for retailer revenue sharing contract based on the alliances will increase with product competition strength.Manufacturers will not give up the alliance voluntarily.

关 键 词：多制造商竞争 纵向联盟 收益共享契约 供应链协调 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]