利他偏好下需求依赖于价格和营销努力的两级供应链决策与协调  

Decision and Coordination Models for Two-stage Supply Chain with Price and Marketing Effort Dependent Demand under Altruistic Preference

作　　者：吴正祥[1] 李宝库[1] WU Zheng-xiang;LI Bao-ku

机构地区：[1]辽宁工程技术大学营销管理学院

出　　处：《中央财经大学学报》2017年第12期108-118,共11页Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目"农村市场渠道管理效率研究--基于三方博弈的角度"(项目编号:71172218);国家自然科学基金资助项目"儒家价值观对农村市场买卖关系影响的模型研究"(项目编号:71202117);高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金联合资助类课题"城市化进程中农民市民消费特征和模式研究--基于心理和行为角度"(项目编号:20122121110005)

摘　　要：随着市场竞争日益激烈,供应链成员通过利他合作最大限度地扩大市场销量、提高各方经济收益显得尤为重要。笔者通过文献梳理发现,已有研究主要考察了利他偏好对成员的定价决策以及批发价格契约协调效果的影响,尚未探索成员具有利他偏好时供应链的有效协调机制,且研究中没有考虑零售商的营销努力因素。笔者在Stackelberg价格博弈模型基础上增加了零售商营销努力决策变量,分别构建了考虑利他偏好的批发价格契约模型、收益共享契约模型、收益共享成本共担契约模型,分析了利他偏好对供应链决策的影响,探讨了批发价格契约、收益共享契约以及收益共享成本共担契约对供应链的协调性。笔者认为:制造商对零售商的利他行为可以激励零售商提高营销努力水平;批发价格契约和收益共享契约均不能解决制造商与零售商因考虑自身利益而造成供应链出现双重边际化效应的问题;通过合理设计收益共享成本共担契约,制造商和零售商能够找到最佳的利他偏好组合实现最大共赢。With market competitions becoming more and more fierce,it seems especially important to furthest expand market sales and improve the economic benefits of all parties by the altruistic cooperation of supply chain members. Through the literature review,we find the scholars mainly study the influence of altruistic preference on the pricing strategy and coordination performance of wholesale price contract,has yet to discuss the effective coordination mechanism of supply chain with members holding the altruistic preference and the variable of retailer marketing effort. This paper increases the variable of retailer marketing effort into the Stackelberg pricing game model; develops wholesale price contract model,revenue sharing contract model,and revenue sharing with effort-cost-sharing contract model, and altruistic preference is taken into account in designing these models; analyzes the impact of altruistic preference on the supply chain decision-making; discusses the supply chain coordination of three contracts（ i. e. wholesale price contract,revenue sharing contract,and revenue sharing with effort-cost-sharing contract）. The research suggests that the altruistic preference of manufacturer plays good role in motivating retailer to improve marketing effort level; wholesale price contract and revenue sharing contract cannot solve the double marginalization problem in supply chain because of the manufacturer and the retailer considering its self-interests first; the manufacturer and the retailer can find the optimal combination of altruistic preference to realize greatest win-win situation by reasonably designing the contract of revenue sharing with effort-cost-sharing.

关 键 词：供应链管理 利他偏好 STACKELBERG博弈 营销努力 协调机制 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]