导游带队过程中“宰客”问题演化博弈分析  

On the Gaming of “Rip-off” in Guided Tour

作　　者：王国栋[1] 卓春英[1] WANG Guodong;ZHU Chunying(Chongqing Vocational College of Water Resources and Electric Engineering , Yongchuan, Chongqing 402160,China)

机构地区：[1]重庆水利电力职业技术学院基础教学部,重庆永川402160

出　　处：《内江师范学院学报》2017年第12期103-106,共4页Journal of Neijiang Normal University

基　　金：重庆市教委课题资助项目(16SKGH255)

摘　　要：为了探讨旅游市场中的导游宰客现象,运用演化博弈理论构建了旅游业中导游团队与游客团队之间的博弈模型,分析了博弈双方的行为演化和策略动态调整过程.利用微分方程稳定性理论对模型均衡点进行讨论,并模拟了参数对模型的影响.研究发现:加大对导游宰客的惩罚力度、降低导游付出的隐形成本、加大对游客恶意投诉的惩罚,能有效保证旅游市场的健康发展及带动整个旅游地区的经济增长.为现实提供理论依据.In order to explore the rip off phenomenon of tour guide in tourism market,using evolutionary game theory,the game model between tour guide team and tourist team in tourism is constructed,and the behavior evolution and dynamic adjustment process of strategy are both analyzed.By aid of the stability theory of differential equation,the model equilibrium point is discussed,and the influence of parameters on the model is simulated and the influences upon the model are simulated.The study finds that to step up the efforts to punish the rip-off phenomenon,to reduce the implicit cost of tourist guide＇s labor and at the same time to intensify the rigidity of punishment for vicious complaints from the tourists,can efficiently safeguard the healthy development of the tourism market and stimulate the regional economic development.

关 键 词：导游 宰客 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F232[经济管理—会计学] O415[经济管理—国民经济]